The Republic of Korea (ROK)

The United States’ security interests in the Republic of Korea (ROK) are fundamentally tied to safeguarding the South Korean economy and ensuring its sovereignty against the constant military threats posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This strategic priority requires the protection of vital industrial sectors based in and around Seoul, which, due to their proximity to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Chinese strategic naval ports, are particularly vulnerable to Chinese People’s Liberation Army-aided military incursion from DPRK. North Korea’s vast military capabilities, particularly its active personnel strength of approximately 1.3 million soldiers and an allocation of nearly one-third of its GDP to military spending, pose a formidable risk. Such a disproportionate military focus enables the DPRK to potentially overwhelm South Korean ground forces in a very swift manner. Given the ROK’s vastly smaller ground force, it lacks the quantitative capacity to deter any aggression. Thus, a robust and committed U.S. military presence is instrumentally critical to reinforcing South Korea’s defensive posture and maintaining stability in this region, a region of such economic and geopolitical significance.

Despite the DPRK’s capability to potentially overrun ROK’s defensive forces, it is not without significant vulnerabilities, specifically its reliance on outdated military equipment and the constraints imposed by U.S. sanctions on its faltering economy, which severely limits its ability to sustain prolonged military engagements without foreign aid, particularly Chinese aid. These weaknesses exemplify the critical necessity of continued U.S. military involvement in the region to act as deterrence and ensure regional stability. Encouragingly enough, though, our South Korean allies are acutely aware of these challenges. In response, they have embarked on an ambitious overhaul of their military capabilities through the “Defense Innovation 4.0” initiative. This program is set to revolutionize the ROK Armed Forces by integrating advanced artificial intelligence technologies into their fighter jets and unmanned drones, all while striving for greater self-reliance by reducing dependency on foreign military technology and manufacturing.

Further evidence of ROK’s commitment to bolstering its defense can be seen by its substantial defense budget of $48.3 billion in 2023, marking a 4.4% increase from the previous year. To put that figure into perspective, this chunk of renewed military spending represents approximately 2.7% of the South Korean GDP, significantly surpassing the military spending of our other East Asian allies, such as Japan at 1.1%, and even outpacing many European nations, which have only recently been reported to have increased to about 2.2%. This robust financial commitment to defense not only enhances South Korea’s military readiness but also solidifies its role as an important military ally as the first island chain of defense against both DPRK and PRC’s military aggression by severely limiting their access to the open sea, the pacific ocean, thus ensuring peace and security in the region.

It is worth noting, however, that although the ROK is increasing its local defense production and reducing its dependency on foreign military imports, it has still spent approximately $13 billion between 2017 and 2021 on acquiring more F-35A jets and other high-altitude aerial systems from the U.S. to strengthen its air force capabilities. This investment is expected to grow in response to the ongoing provocations from the DPRK, thereby increasing our overall arms sales to the ROK. Moreover, as mentioned in the recent “24th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue,” the U.S. has reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to military support in the region. This includes frequent military exercises and a clear emphasis on using both conventional and nuclear weapons to deter threats in the Korean Peninsula, whether it is from the DPRK or PRC, ensuring a highly coordinated and determined posture is displayed to deter any potential acts of aggression.

Now, while our strategic defense initiatives in the ROK offer some degree of reassurance, we must still pay close attention to the ever-shifting political power dynamics. After the detrimental defeat of the PPP party in last week’s parliamentary elections, in which the opposition fell short of a supermajority of just merely eight seats, it has become increasingly clear that President Yoon is starting to lose popularity among the Korean people. Consequently, this would complicate Yoon’s political agenda, hindering his efforts to increase military spending, all while maintaining the current budget, as seen in the opposition leader’s victory speech, in which he repeatedly emphasized tackling domestic issues.

Under the Korean Constitution, while President Yoon can veto legislation under Article 53, Section Two, the National Assembly could also override such vetoes with a two-thirds majority under Section Four. With the re-emergence of the DPK, the opposition party may steer the ROK’s policies back toward dialogue and shift away from the tougher military stances that President Yoon embraces. An approach that undermines our strategic objectives, particularly concerning DPRK, as the opposition party DPK and their coalition tend to favor negotiation over military confrontation, a stance that was prominent during former President Moon Jae-in’s term with his historic handshake with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, which, despite its good original intentions, has been repeatedly proven to be ineffective against DPRK’s aggression.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

The threat posed by the DPRK extends significantly beyond its immediate neighbors, directly endangering U.S. naval and military bases across East Asia, particularly first island chain countries with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and, of course, most importantly, our strategic naval outposts in Guam, Hawaii, and San Diego. The ability to target key American military positions represents a profound security risk. Despite an overall decrease in missile testing by about 68% in 2023, from 73 to 23, the rate of ICBM tests—those capable of exceeding 5000 miles—remained stable. One report suggests that North Korea’s focus on these long-range missiles, including models that could travel up to 15,000 kilometers (over 9,000 miles), could threaten to saturate our defense systems if launched in large numbers.

Furthermore, increased financial support from China, which saw a 15% rise in 2023, might stabilize North Korean domestic conditions enough to boost their military provocations. Speculations are that this will aid in their expected missile arsenal expansion from 100 to 300, attributing to continued instability in the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, the health of Kim Jong Un and potential succession plans involving his sister, Kim Yo Jong, who is likely to continue his consolidation of power approach to governance, is another great concern. With North Korea recently ruling out reunification and labeling South Korea as its foremost foe, any hope for dialogue seems increasingly fraught. These factors, combined with a scenario where DPRK could exploit to overwhelm our interceptors, suggest that meticulous monitoring and strategic foresight are vital to mitigate these emerging threats and that protecting our security interests is inherently contingent on our ability to avert destruction to our allies in this region.